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INTRODUCTION 
Government plays a large role in the preservation of the nation’s 
natural resources, including state and national parks. As such, state 
and federal governments have set in place regional land use schemes 
that seek to preserve these large parklands that often span local 
boundaries. However, traditionally, land use regulation is a function 
left to local governments pursuant to their police powers.1 In 
furtherance of this local power to regulate the use of land, the 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes clear that the federal 
government has the ability to regulate federal lands, but makes no 
mention of its ability to control non-federal lands.2 On a lower level, 
many states have explicitly granted local governments the authority to 
regulate the use of their land.3 In contrast to these principles, 
governments often preempt local land use regulations when seeking 
 
1 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”). 
3 See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 264 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 19 (McKinney 
2013); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 2013). 
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to preserve natural resources that exist within a region or to promote 
the interests of the state.4 
Regional land use schemes are set in place when the government 
has an interest in the resource to be preserved.5 Within the United 
States, the federal government has a history of conserving the 
country’s natural resources for ecological and recreational reasons. 
The development of the national parks system was deemed a federal 
priority evidenced by the creation and expansion of the National Park 
Service (NPS).6 President Woodrow Wilson created the NPS in 1916 
to “promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas . . . to conserve 
the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner 
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment 
of future generations.”7 Similarly, states have taken an interest in the 
preservation of state parks and therefore have prevented local land use 
regulation.8 
Often times, conflict is created when land use regulation is taken 
out of the hands of local governments. The classic debate can be 
framed by the concepts of localism and regionalism: whether it is 
 
4 See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State 
Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 500 (1993). See also Power 
NY Act of 2011, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 388 (McKinney) (preempts local government land 
use control for the siting of energy facilities over 25 MW, which will include more wind 
and solar renewable energy facilities). 
5 Other examples of federal preemption and involvement in local land use include the 
First Amendment’s prohibition of municipalities from completely excluding adult 
businesses, see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981), the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 preemption of local control over cellular communication 
towers, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 preemption of local control over liquid natural gas terminals, 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311, 119 Stat. 594 (2005), the Coastal 
Zone Management Act and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 both requiring states and 
local governments to properly plan (however they do not specifically prescribe land use 
requirements that must be enacted), Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972). 
6 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (2012) (“Congress declares that the [parks within the] national park 
system . . . though distinct in character, are united through their inter-related purposes and 
resources into one national park system as cumulative expressions of a single national 
heritage; that, individually and collectively, these areas derive increased national dignity 
and recognition of their superb environmental quality through their inclusion jointly with 
each other in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit and 
inspiration of all the people of the United States.”). 
7 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
8 See Nolon, supra note 4. 
GOTTLIEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/13  9:20 AM 
38 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 29, 35 
good policy for local governments to govern the use of their land or 
whether governance should be in the hands of a regional agency. This 
question depends on several factors, including the policy being 
implemented and its goals. While each theory—localism and 
regionalism—has its advantages, each may also impede policy goals 
from being achieved. In the context of natural resource conservation, 
specifically the conservation of parklands, this Article suggests that 
regional governance is the most advantageous because local 
government policies may not align with the conservation goals of the 
region for various reasons. However, regional policy decisions must 
incorporate collaborative processes that include all affected 
stakeholders within the region. Not only will this process preserve 
natural resources, but it will also safeguard the notions of localism 
that are so vital to strong communities. 
This Article will analyze the methods of government regulation of 
private land uses within national and state parks, identifying both the 
various advantages and weaknesses. Specifically, this Article will 
analyze the Fire Island National Seashore and the Adirondack State 
Park’s regional land use schemes, where the federal government and 
New York, respectively, have faced difficulties conserving a park that 
has both local government and privately-owned land within its 
boundaries. The Article discusses, in detail, the forms of collaborative 
decision making that can apply to a regional land use agency, 
including forms of participatory planning and negotiated rulemaking. 
The analysis will provide a best practices model for making regional 
land use decisions in these unique situations that includes installing a 
collaborative method of decision making. Making decisions through 
collaborative means increases transparency, accountability, and 
regulatory conformance by building consensus-based decisions. The 
Article will follow two ongoing regional processes designed to 
preserve parkland and highlight how collaborative processes are a 
pragmatic solution to the local and regional divide. 
I 
FEDERALISM, LAND USE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
When formulating environmental policy, it is important to 
understand the politics at play. Environmental policy is often 
controversial because environmental impacts transcend governmental 
boundaries. Thus, it is not out of the ordinary for more than one 
governmental entity to be involved in formulating environmental 
policies. Furthermore, each governmental stakeholder will possess 
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different priorities and mold its policies accordingly. Within 
environmental law, “cooperative federalism” is used to describe the 
relationship between the federal government and the states or their 
counterparts, local governments.9 More specifically, and for the 
purposes of this Article, it is important to outline the major 
stakeholders in a regional land use system, which includes local 
governments, residents, and the regional entities. Through an 
examination of the concepts involved in a cooperative scheme, 
localism, and regionalism, governments will be able to apply certain 
best practices when forming regional land use authorities to promote 
their interests. 
A. Localism vs. Regionalism 
Many scholars have discussed the concepts of localism and 
regionalism in the context of metropolitan areas, noting the 
advantages and disadvantages of both.10 This Article takes the debate 
outside of the metropolitan areas and applies the same principles to 
the conservation of natural resources. On a theoretical level, the 
conflict between local governments and regional land use entities 
represents the diverging interests of localism and regionalism. 
Regionalism is vital to the proper natural resource conservation that 
lends itself to multijurisdictional enforcement problems. It provides a 
framework for uniform land use regulations across the park. 
However, this is not to say that local land use control is not without 
advantages. In fact, localism creates a sense of community and allows 
residents to address concerns through an enhanced, although arguably 
flawed, democratic process. This Section will explore the concepts of 
localism and regionalism and how they apply in the context of natural 
resource conservation. In addition, this Section will address the 
obstacles inherent in local politics that impede regional entities from 
achieving their goals. 
Professor Richard Briffault describes localism as “the view that the 
existing system of a large number of relatively small governments 
wielding power over such critical matters as local land use regulation, 
local taxation, and the financing of local public services ought to be 
 
9 See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 183 (2005). 
10 See Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49 (2012); 
Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
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preserved.”11 Conversely, he describes regionalism as a shift of power 
from local governments to a regional authority, restricting local 
autonomy and decreasing the ability of local governments to address 
local concerns.12 Regionalism suggests that the identified region is 
connected by economic, social, or ecological interests that ignore 
local boundaries.13 For example, and most helpful for the purposes of 
this Article, an ecological region may be identified by common 
natural resources such air, land, or water.14 
It is important to note that the advantages of localism should be 
preserved and incorporated while achieving regional goals. Without 
incorporation of these benefits, a regional land use system will not be 
sustainable. The benefits of localism include the efficient allocation of 
public services, increased democratic processes, and the creation of a 
strong community. First, local governments are best suited to provide 
local services to their residents as well as address concerns that 
residents express.15 Local governments must be accountable to their 
residents because if not, according to the Tiebout model, residents 
will become frustrated and vacate for a more sympathetic locality.16 
Second, it is argued that localism has the ability to increase the 
democratic process and, as such, increase meaningful public 
participation.17 On the local level, there are more opportunities for 
residents to directly speak to their government because, in theory, 
local officials are more accessible than officials in other levels of 
government.18 It is also argued that participation is more effective and 
influential at the local level, due in part to the size of local 
governments.19 For example, the state and federal governments are 
 
11 Briffault, supra note 10, at 1. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 3. 
14 See id.; see also Keith H. Hirokawa, Three Stories About Nature: Property, the 
Environment, and Ecosystem Services, 62 MERCER L. REV. 541, 593 (2011) (“[T]he 
Ecosystem Services approach recognizes that the value added of ecological goods and 
services may derive from services performed off-site and likewise recognizes that the 
functionality of ecosystems on-site will impact the value of goods and services benefitting 
other properties. As such, the Ecosystem Services manner of attributing value to 
ecosystem functionality serves as an articulation of the idea that property interests may 
accrue inside another’s property boundaries.”). 
15 See Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 416–17 (1956). 
16 See id. at 421–22; see also Parlow, supra note 10, at 55. 
17 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 16. 
18 See id. at 16–17. 
19 See id. 
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large entities with many public policy forums, and therefore local 
residents are intimidated to participate in the formation of policy.20 
However, this notion is fading due to the ineffectiveness of the 
traditional forms of public participation as is highlighted in the case 
studies throughout this Article. This Article will suggest that local and 
regional conflicts are not born from inherently different forms of 
governance, but from a lack of communication that occurs as a result 
of traditional public participation models.21 Local governments do not 
feel disadvantaged by the regional land use process when 
communication principles, representing best practices, are 
incorporated in the formation of a regional authority. 
Lastly, localism suggests that local governments are a community 
of connected individuals with common interests.22 This sense of 
identity is strong in many communities and can be the cause of 
contention with regional authorities.23 In turn, local governments may 
respond through protest and defiance, which is an illegitimate way to 
recapture land use control. Professor Briffault notes that the major 
obstacle to a successful regional scheme is “whether regionalists will 
be able to persuade people that their interests are sufficiently tied in 
with those of the residents or other communities within the region.”24 
Many times, regional agencies aspire to realize regional goals in 
the face of local needs.25 The task at hand calls for an identification of 
ways that local governments can be maintained and work in 
collaboration with the regional entity to serve both local and regional 
needs. Professor Briffault notes that: 
 
20 Parlow, supra note 10, at 57 (“[F]ederal and state governments . . . are simply too 
big, remote, and inaccessible for the average citizen to engage with and participate in.”). 
21 See generally Sean F. Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate: Encouraging 
Collaborative Approaches to Controversial Development Decision, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 103 (2009). 
22 See Briffault, supra note 10, at 17. 
23 Many times when local governments seek to dissolve or consolidate with one another 
the deeply rooted sense of identity and community hinders, and even blocks, the political 
process that is involved. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 
1364, 1417–19 (2012) (“The concept of community captures a major opposing force after 
commencement of a dissolution campaign. It is a notion that cityhood defines a place, 
forges community bonds, and preserves local history. Captured here as well is the idea that 
bonds—residents with one another, but also residents with their government—are stronger 
when formed at a small scale, because participation is better and government closer.”). 
24 Briffault, supra note 10, at 29. 
25 See id. at 3. 
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Many of these proposals [to create regional entities] would leave 
local powers and structures in place, but through a combination of 
incentives or requirements that local actions conform to regional 
standards, would superimpose on local decision-making regional 
goals or norms concerning such matters as the management of new 
growth, the allocation of affordable housing, or the sharing of the 
local revenue gains from new property tax base growth.26 
While this is true, regional authorities also need to alter the way 
they govern. A shift from traditional practices to a more collaborative 
process will ensure that local concerns are considered on the regional 
level. Such a shift would alter the decision-making process at the 
regional level to create a process where all stakeholders are involved 
in regional decisions, including local governments.27 On the other 
hand, it will also be necessary for local governments to amend their 
local procedures to include the notions of regional governance and the 
goals that regional governance seeks to implement. 
In some circumstances, local governments feel incentivized to 
deviate from regional land use goals, especially with respect to 
regional conservation. For instance, local governments that have the 
ability to levy property taxes as a source of revenue may be 
encouraged to relax local zoning laws to increase development by 
new residents.28 Additionally, local politicians view zoning as a 
political activity and as a means to obtain job security.29 Local 
officials will tend to make land use decisions to benefit their 
constituents, thus increasing their chances of reelection.30 In this 
respect, local governments are encouraged, or incentivized, to govern 
through this consumer-based model, whereby they are constantly 
 
26 Id. at 5. 
27 See id. at 6 (“The third component of regionalism is the interest in creating new 
mechanisms that would be able to articulate regional concerns and formulate and 
implement regional policies. Regional policy-making does not necessarily require regional 
institutions.”). 
28 See id. at 8. 
29 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS 
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 208 (1985). 
30 Id. 
Federal and state regulations that apply only to small, specific geographic areas 
should be scrutinized. The opportunity for those landowners adversely affected by 
the regulations to influence legislators is considerably restricted. They cannot as 
easily band together with other landowners and allies form other areas, since . . . 
offering compensation to those adversely affected in well-defined geographic area 
would seem to be much lower. 
Id. at 222. 
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competing for residents, business, and votes.31 In terms of 
environmental conservation and other regional goals, it is important to 
align local polices and regional policies to be successful with a 
comprehensive plan. 
Regional land use agencies seek to solve the inherent problems that 
localism creates, such as the inability to address impacts that are 
without bounds and intraregional.32 Established principles of ecology 
state that: “Property does not exist in isolation because the effects of 
its uses flow outside of the boundaries of ownership.”33 The notion 
behind comprehensive planning allows local decisions to be produced 
within a framework that should take into account the externalities 
involved in land use determinations.34 In practice, however, local land 
use planning has a tendency to be individualized and in response to 
specific projects.35 The recognition that local land use decisions may 
create negative externalities on surrounding localities supports the 
argument for regional land use agencies.36 For example, a local 
 
31 Parlow, supra note 10, at 55–56 (“Local governments fear losing these consumer-
voters—and their attendant tax dollars—and thus compete for residents and businesses by 
offering a distinct package of goods, services, and regulations. Citizens can freely choose 
where to live or relocate and can thus ‘shop’ for the local government that best meets their 
needs, interests, and desires. In this regard, localities have an incentive to respond and 
cater to their consumer-voters. Indeed, local governments must compete for citizens and 
businesses or face the consequences of an eroding tax base. This market-like competition, 
in turn, creates an efficient allocation of public goods and services—a desirable result in a 
metropolitan region.” (citations omitted)). 
32 See id. at 61–62. 
33 Shelia R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land 
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 528 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 
(1971). 
34 See Foster, supra note 33, at 547. 
35 See id. (arguing that the liberal use of zoning amendments and variances furthers 
private interests adversely affects the deliberative processes). 
36 Parlow, supra note 10, at 58–59 (“[Within the context of a metropolitan area,] 
localism focuses almost entirely on each individual municipality without concern for 
interaction with, or externalities imposed upon, neighboring localities. Municipalities in a 
region are not isolated from one another, where citizens interact with one another solely 
within the boundaries of their city. While a city’s boundaries once defined the locality and 
isolated it from other communities, the nature and growth of metropolitan areas have 
blurred those once clearly demarcated lines. Today, [a] person is likely to live in one 
locality, work in another, shop in a third, seek entertainment in a fourth, and move through 
a large number of others in the course of a day. Localities are now more connected and 
dependent on one another, and this reality leads—or should lead—to public policy 
decisions that consider the entire region rather than simply the interests of those located 
within the metes and bounds of a particular locality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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government may choose to enhance development adversely impacting 
surrounding forestland. The adjacent locality is therefore forced to 
deal with the externalities produced from neighboring land use 
decisions. The municipality impacted by these externalities does not 
have any influence in the political process of the government 
producing the negative externalities and therefore is without 
recourse.37 A regional land use agency would be able to harness the 
negative externalities resulting from individual land use choices. 
This is not to say that land use planning should be completely 
taken out of the hands of local governments in these circumstances. 
To guard against losing the advantages associated with localism, 
collaborative processes should be mandatory within regional land use 
schemes. While some forms of collaborative processes are mandated 
by land use processes, this Article suggests going beyond the 
traditional form of participation. The best practices discussed in this 
Article will empower local governments during the regional land use 
process and produce suitable land use practices to address both local 
and regional concerns. 
This Article will explore two case studies. The first is an analysis 
of the federal land use scheme on the Fire Island National Seashore 
and will discuss how the federal government seeks to preempt local 
control. The second is an analysis of the Adirondack State Park, 
which will provide an in-depth description of a regional land use 
authority that is very involved and has designed policies that allow for 
the concept of localism to be incorporated into the regional agency. 
The case studies will provide an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each system and show how collaborative efforts may 
increase compliance with regional goals, reduce delays, and address 
transparency concerns. 
II 
THE CONSERVATION OF NATIONAL PARKS 
The NPS has been charged with the regulation and preservation of 
the national parks to protect the beautiful natural resources for future 
generations.38 As a federal agency and a subset of the Department of 
 
37 See Brittan J. Bush, A New Regionalist Perspective on Land Use and the 
Environment, 56 HOW. L.J. 207, 209, 221 (2012). 
38 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OVERVIEW (2011), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/news/upload/NPS-Overview_11-7-2011.pdf (“[T]he fundamental 
purpose of the NPS ‘is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the  
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the Interior, the NPS is specifically tasked with focusing on federal 
parkland that has been deemed a valuable natural resource and thus 
requires preservation.39 Conservation is a difficult task when land 
within a park is not entirely federal. The NPS has employed several 
techniques over the years to address this concern, “including 
acquisition of land, purchases of easements, and cooperative 
agreements . . . .”40 However, the problem remains that certain private 
lands, without a conservation mechanism attached, may adversely 
affect the park by deviating from the conservation purposes. One 
solution employed is federal zoning, which preempts local 
governments from administering their land use authority. 
A. Federal Zoning, Local Governments, and Private Land 
Local zoning and land use regulation may not necessarily be the 
best method for the conservation of wide-ranging natural resources. 
Many natural resources and environmental concerns transcend local 
boundaries and thus require regional efforts.41 Local governments 
often view the conservation of natural resources in terms of costs and 
benefits. It may not be worth it for a local government to forgo 
development for the conservation of open space, and therefore local 
zoning may not further preservation. To avoid local government 
issues, the NPS and the Department of the Interior have implemented 
federal zoning standards over localities within national parks. To 
properly analyze the federal government’s ability to regulate the use 
of non-federal land, it is important to examine the history of the 
Property Clause and subsequent case law. 
1. Legal Obstacles: Federal Zoning and the Property Clause 
The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress 
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States.”42 The Property Clause has been interpreted to limit 
 
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.’” (quoting 
the National Park Service Organic Act)). 
39 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
40 John S. Davis, The National Trails System Act and the Use of Protective Federal 
Zoning, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 191 (1986). 
41 Id. at 218; see Hirokawa, supra note 14. 
42 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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the federal government’s ability to regulate activities taking place on 
non-federal land.43 Throughout a long history of case law, the 
Property Clause has been progressively interpreted to allow the 
federal government to regulate the use of non-federal lands. 
In Kleppe v. New Mexico, New Mexico challenged the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act, which sought to protect “all 
unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the 
United States . . . [because they were considered] . . . an integral part 
of the natural system of the public lands.”44 New Mexico asserted that 
Congress had no proof that such animals roamed over public lands 
and therefore had no jurisdiction to pass legislation for their 
protection.45 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
act and stated that the ability of the federal government to use the 
powers granted in the Property Clause over public lands is “without 
limitation[].”46 Therefore, Congress had the power to reach beyond its 
territorial limits and regulate the wildlife that was present upon the 
lands.47 
Similarly, in United States v. Brown, the Eighth Circuit held that 
Congress can reach beyond its territorial limits and stated that “the 
congressional power over federal lands . . . include[s] the authority to 
regulate activities on non-federal public waters in order to protect 
wildlife and visitors on the lands.”48 In Minnesota v. Block, Minnesota 
challenged the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, which 
restricted the use of certain vehicles, including motorboats and 
snowmobiles, on non-federal land.49 The court again relied on Kleppe 
and stated that: 
Under [the Property Clause’s] authority to protect public land, 
Congress’ power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the 
public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal 
lands. Congress clearly has the power to dedicate federal land for 
particular purposes. As a necessary incident of that power, Congress 
must have the ability to insure that these lands be protected against 
interference with their intended purposes.50 
 
43 Davis, supra note 40, at 234–35. 
44 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
45 Id. at 533. 
46 Id. at 539; see also Davis, supra note 40, at 237. 
47 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 538 (1976); see also Davis, supra note 40, at 237. 
48 United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d. 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977). 
49 Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d. 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1981). 
50 Id. at 1249. 
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Block represents the broad authority currently applied by the 
federal government when it implements federal zoning standards 
upon private property within national parks. 
2. Forms of Federal Zoning 
From these interpretations of the Property Clause, the federal 
government implemented a system of regulating private property that 
may have an impact on the pristine national parklands. The first 
technique employed by the federal government involves the federal 
government merely giving advice to local governments to encourage 
certain zoning measures and mandates notification of any variance 
that may be approved by the local planning agency.51 This technique 
does not require a set of zoning regulations for the local adoption nor 
does it provide an enforcement mechanism for the federal government 
to ensure compliance.52 
In the past, the federal government has taken a more direct 
approach and directly regulated land uses within local boundaries. 
This process bypasses local agencies and directly regulates private 
land within the park.53 For example, Sawtooth National Recreation 
Area is subject to a federal scheme where the federal government 
directly regulates its land uses.54 The Sawtooth National Recreation 
Area has 75,600 acres with more than 20,000 acres of private land.55 
Private land within the recreation area is directly regulated pursuant to 
Public Law 92-400, which allows the Secretary of Agriculture to 
promulgate land use standards.56 In Sawtooth, the only enforcement 
power is condemnation against noncompliant properties.57 Under this 
scheme, private landowners have the ability to directly communicate 
with the Forest Service regarding the compliance of its property.58 
Through these communication avenues, landowners are able to better 
 
51 Davis, supra note 40, at 219–20. 
52 Id. at 220. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 220–21. 
55 U.S. FOREST SERV. & THE SAWTOOTH SOC’Y, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
PRIVATE LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE SAWTOOTH NATIONAL RECREATION AREA 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5211589.pdf. 
56 Act of Aug. 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-400, 86 Stat. 612; U.S. FOREST SERV. & THE 
SAWTOOTH SOC’Y, supra note 55. 
57 16 U.S.C. § 460aa-3(b) (2012); 36 C.F.R. 292.14(a) (2013). 
58 U.S. FOREST SERV. & THE SAWTOOTH SOC’Y, supra note 55, at 2. 
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understand the regulations and maintain compliance.59 The Forest 
Service has noted that the most efficient outcomes result when 
landowners collaborate with the Service early and often on a 
development project.60 
However, direct regulation of land by the federal government is not 
without concern. Residents traditionally seek land use determinations, 
such as permits and variances, from the local governing bodies due to 
the intimate relationship residents have with their local agencies. 
Under this local process, the landowner does not feel overwhelmed 
from dealing with a larger governmental entity. However, if 
landowners are required to handle land use matters on the federal 
level, there is the potential that they may feel defensive against a 
larger governmental entity. Further, the federal government agency 
may be overwhelmed and inundated with local land use matters in a 
time of scarce human and financial resources. This completely 
disregards the concept of localism and thus does not capture the 
advantages to local government regulations, such as increased 
democratic processes, efficient distribution of services, and the 
creation of a strong sense of community. 
Direct regulation does not allow for a collaborative process. 
Communication opportunities between the federal and local 
governments on current land use issues may be difficult with the local 
government completely preempted by federal involvement. For 
example, if notification requirements are not set in place, the federal 
government may be making land use decisions that affect local 
governments, but the locality may not be aware of the decision or be 
involved in the process. In essence, the local land use process is 
completely disregarded and bypassed. 
Lastly, the most common federal land use scheme is the “Sword-
of-Damocles” approach.61 This approach has been implemented in 
many of the national parks around the country, including the two 
seashore cases mentioned in this Article, the Cape Cod and Fire 
Island National Seashores.62 As an alternative to direct regulation, 
local governments are mandated to adopt the federal zoning 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 7. 
61 Davis, supra note 40, at 220. 
62 Davis, supra note 40, at 220 nn.190–93, (explaining that in addition to Cape Cod and 
Fire Island, the Sword-of-Damocles approach has been applied to the Indiana Dunes 
National Lakeshore, the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore, the Whiskeytown-
Shasta-Trinity National Recreation Area, and the Jean Lafitte National Historical Park). 
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standards, promulgated by the NPS, in their local code.63 The NPS 
and federal government hold condemnation power against all 
noncompliant properties, including private, but that power is 
suspended for all property that is compliant with approved local 
ordinances.64 
The “Sword-of-Damocles” scheme is a more politically sensitive 
approach to federal land use regulation. However, it is plagued with 
enforcement problems and is subject to local government politics.65 
While procedurally different, the “Sword-of-Damocles” system is not 
theoretically distinct from direct federal regulation. Federal regulation 
of private land is masked behind the mandated adoption of federal 
zoning into local codes. By comparing the systems and recognizing 
the need for increased collaboration between local governments and 
federal agencies, it would be beneficial to revise the “Sword-of-
Damocles” approach by adding more collaboration between federal 
agencies, local governments, and residents. The Fire Island National 
Seashore provides a good example of how this process unfolds and 
highlights the problems that may result. 
3. The “Sword-of-Damocles” and the Fire Island National Seashore 
When creating the Fire Island National Seashore (FINS) Act, 
legislators looked to the Cape Cod model and its implementation of 
the “Sword-of-Damocles” land use scheme as a success story.66 The 
Cape Cod legislation was adopted because the “increasing popularity 
of Cape Cod threatened to jeopardize the historic and scenic integrity 
of the area . . . .”67 The Cape Cod formula did not meet opposition, 
was described as being implemented with “comparatively little 
friction,” and was able to capture nearly universal support from 
localities.68 The FINS Act, enacted in 1964, was the beginning of 
 
63 See Charles Gottlieb, Federalism on Fire Island: A Federal Land Use Scheme 
Designed to Preserve the Nation’s Natural Resources, 4 N.Y. Zoning L. & Prac. Rep. 
(2013) (analyzing in-depth the Fire Island National Seashore Act and how the land use 
process on Fire Island should be implemented and enforced). 
64 Id. 
65 Davis, supra note 40, at 222. 
66 See Gottlieb, supra note 63. 
67 United States v. Certain Land Located in the Cnty. of Barnstable, 889 F.2d 352, 353 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
68 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, LAND REGULATION AT FIRE 
ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 1964–2004, at 48 (2008), 
available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/fiis/land_reg.pdf. 
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federal land use regulation for private properties and local 
governments on Fire Island.69 
The “Sword-of-Damocles” model charges the Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior (the Secretary) with promulgating zoning 
standards that will be applied to Fire Island properties, including 
acreage, setbacks, and frontage standards.70 Each local government 
must have its local zoning code approved by the Secretary based on 
whether the local government has adopted the prescribed federal 
zoning standards.71 The Secretary may reject local zoning codes if 
they “contain[] any provisions that [the Secretary] considers adverse 
to the protection and development . . . of the area comprising the 
national seashore . . . .”72 Lastly, the Secretary may reject a code that 
does not follow the proscribed procedures for granting a variance 
within the seashore’s boundaries.73 
The main enforcement mechanism on Fire Island is the power to 
condemn all properties not in compliance with the federal standards 
or any approved local code.74 However, major flaws are inherent in 
the enforcement mechanism. For instance, Fire Island is comprised of 
many private properties that predate the act. Such properties are in 
contrast to the conservation goals that were later expressed in the 
FINS Act. Unlike the Cape Cod formula, the FINS Act deems all 
existing properties consistent with the Act and therefore protected 
from condemnation.75 When the Cape Cod formula was enacted, it 
was largely underdeveloped, and therefore preexisting development 
did not need protection.76 Conversely, Fire Island was largely 
 
69 Gottlieb, supra note 63. 
70 See 36 C.F.R. § 28.1 (2013); Gottlieb, supra note 63. 
71 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(c)–(d) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 28.13, 28.15 (2013); 
Gottlieb, supra note 63. 
72 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(d)(1) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(1) (2013); Gottlieb, 
supra note 63. 
73 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(d)(1) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(3) (2013); Gottlieb, 
supra note 63. 
74 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(e) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 459e-1(e) (2012) (describing three 
alternatives a landowner may choose from in the event condemnation is pursued under the 
FINS Act: (1) receiving fair market value in exchange for taking the property in fee simple 
absolute; (2) retaining a life estate in the property, with a corresponding decrease in the 
fair market value as determined by standard actuarial methods; or (3) retaining an estate 
for twenty-five years, with a similar pro-rated decrease in the fair market value). 
75 16 U.S.C. § 459e-1(f) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.2(h) (2013). 
76 See LEE E. KOPPELMAN & SETH FORMAN, THE FIRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE: 
A HISTORY 116–17 (2008) (“The Cape Cod National Seashore boundaries include all the 
important natural features needing protection, but not the major developed areas. Though  
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developed in 1964 when the act was implemented, which caused the 
legislature to seek protection for these preexisting properties.77 With 
such a high level of noncompliant preexisting properties on Fire 
Island, it became imperative that local government enforce the federal 
nonconforming use standards to transform preexisting properties to 
compliant properties.78 
Additionally, the NPS does not have enforcement power against 
local governments who choose not to adopt the federal standards. 
NPS enforcement is solely focused on private property owners who 
are noncompliant with the federal standards or an approved local code 
and not against local governments who do not adopt the federal 
standards.79 In Biderman v. Morton, the court held that plaintiffs were 
unable to assert an injunction against the local governments’ zoning 
activities, stating: 
[The Fire Island National Seashore Act,] quite simply, does not 
prohibit any zoning action by the various local governments located 
on the seashore. . . . [T]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized 
only to condemn property zoned in a manner of which he 
disapproves—an action which cannot possibly be interpreted as a 
retroactive declaration of municipal illegality.80 
The Biderman court recognized that the NPS, pursuant to the FINS 
Act, is unable to enforce or bring actions against local governments 
for their responsibilities under the Act. This allows the local 
governments to violate the zoning standards without repercussions 
felt by the landowners. For example, if a local government seeks to 
deviate from the federal standards and grants an improper building 
permit, the locality is not subject to enforcement, but the landowner is 
now subject to condemnation even though he or she holds a permit 
from the local agency. By giving the NPS enforcement powers 
against noncompliant local governments, conservation would increase 
as a result of federal standards being applied. 
 
privately owned totals approximately 17 percent of all land within the Cape Cod National 
Seashore after initial federal purchases were completed, much of that private land was in 
the form of undeveloped parcels and scattered dwellings. The most developed commercial 
and residential areas of each town were left outside the National Seashore.”). 
77 See id.; see also NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 68, at 
1. 
78 See KOPPELMAN & FORMAN, supra note 76, at 116–17; see also NAT’L PARK SERV., 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 68, at 1. 
79 See 16 U.S.C. § 459e-1 (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.15 (2013). 
80 Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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Even where the NPS seeks condemnation, it lacks funding to pay 
reasonable compensation to acquire the property.81 A lack of federal 
funding for acquisition, coupled with the rising property values on 
Fire Island, has turned the condemnation process into a mere threat.82 
If local governments grant improper land use decisions and the 
federal government is unable to enforce using its power of 
condemnation, conservation becomes unachievable. An examination 
of recent land use determinations on Fire Island will show how the 
current regional land use scheme is ineffective due to a lack of 
collaboration between local governments and the NPS. 
4. The Story of Land Use on Fire Island: Past to Present 
Through a case study of the “Sword-of-Damocles” approach, as 
applied to Fire Island, it is apparent that variance requests or code 
changes cause turmoil within the community and block the 
conservation efforts of the regional agency.83 Exacerbating the matter, 
local governments have sought to deviate from the federal 
regulations. Collaborative methods of decision making are needed 
any time there is a proposed amendment to the local code or federal 
regulations, or when any land use decision is made to avoid 
controversy. 
Local government opposition to federal regulations was at issue in 
United States v. 0.16 of an Acre of Land. In that case, preexisting 
property within the Town of Brookhaven was to be subdivided and 
developed, so it required a building permit and a variance.84 The 
Town of Brookhaven granted the variance and building permit 
notwithstanding objections from the NPS, and construction 
commenced soon after.85 As a result, the Secretary of the Interior 
 
81 See NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 68, at 54. 
82 See KOPPELMAN & FORMAN, supra note 76, at 134; see also Gottlieb, supra note 63, 
at 1. 
83 The Fire Island National Seashore was created 
[f]or the purpose of conserving and preserving for the use of future generations 
certain relatively unspoiled and undeveloped beaches, dunes, and other natural 
features within Suffolk County, New York, which possess high values to the Nation 
as examples of unspoiled areas of great natural beauty in close proximity to large 
concentrations of urban population. 
16 U.S.C. § 459e(a) (2012). 
84 United States v. 0.16 of an Acre of Land, 517 F. Supp. 1115, 1117–18 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
85 Id. 
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initiated condemnation proceedings.86 The court held that the 
Secretary may condemn part of the property that had been improved 
and not maintained in accordance with the federal standards.87 This 
case alludes to the fact that, often times, local governments are not 
compliant, and the NPS enforcement authority acts as a safeguard. 
However, when enforcement is not carried out properly, the safeguard 
is ineffective, and local governments and property owners may act 
without repercussion. 
Most applications for land development on Fire Island pertain to 
variance requests to develop land, erect a structure, or modify either 
preexisting nonconforming uses or illegal nonconforming uses. Cases 
at the appellate division, and at the local level, demonstrate a history 
of noncompliance with the federal standards and recent efforts to 
attain compliance. The cases reveal that planning boards have been 
guided by the precedence of past variances. However, if past 
variances are in violation of the federal standards, they are adverse to 
the conservation goals set forth by the NPS. 
For instance, in Switzgable v. Board of Zoning Appeals, the court 
annulled one portion of an area variance that was granted by the 
Town of Brookhaven Board of Zoning Appeals (the Board).88 The 
court found that the area variance, which allowed the plaintiff to erect 
a ten-foot solid fence on his property line, was arbitrary and 
capricious.89 The variance must be supported by a rational basis, and 
the Board must conduct a balancing test prior to granting the 
variance.90 In this case, the Board cited to comparable structures in 
the area as a rational basis for the variance; however, as the court 
noted, those structures were either nonconforming or built illegally.91 
Furthermore, the court noted that the Board did not conduct the 
required balancing, stating that “the Board failed to engage in the 
requisite balancing test, disregarding evidence that granting the 
variances would have an adverse impact upon the physical or 
environmental conditions in the neighborhood, which is a part of the 
Fire Island National Seashore.”92 The Board also disregarded 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1118. 
88 See In re Switzgable v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 911 N.Y.S.2d 391 (App. Div. 2010). 
89 Id. at 392–93. 
90 Id. at 391–93. 
91 Id. at 392–93. 
92 Id. at 392. 
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evidence from residents in the area who had “personal knowledge” of 
the adverse impact that the variance would have as well as 
alternatives that could be sought.93 
Presently, the Town of Brookhaven is in the process of amending 
its nonconforming use statutes. Prior to recent proposals, and in 
accordance with the FINS Act, nonconforming uses in the Town of 
Brookhaven could not be altered unless the alteration was to bring the 
use back into conformance.94 Federal regulations are sympathetic to 
the fact that nonconforming use standards may need to be relaxed in 
specific circumstances to allow for recovery from natural disasters, 
fires, or other hazards.95 However, federal regulations only allow 
reconstruction of the structure to its original dimensions and do not 
allow for additional alterations.96 
In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the Town of Brookhaven 
introduced Local Law #3 that would allow for nonconforming 
redevelopment. Under the local law, residents of the Town of 
Brookhaven located on Fire Island would have the same ability to 
rebuild as those residents located in the Town of Brookhaven on the 
mainland.97 When proposed, the local law made no mention of 
nonconforming uses being rebuilt as a result of natural disasters.98 If 
the amendment had specifically allowed for the rebuilding of 
properties destroyed by natural disasters, then it may have conformed 
to federal regulations. Controversy has followed these amendments 
because the language in the local law has been interpreted by some to 
go beyond the FINS Act. 
Pursuant to the FINS Act, the Superintendent of the Seashore must 
be notified of any local law change and have the opportunity to 
object.99 On January 7, 2013, the NPS, via a letter from 
Superintendent Chris Soller, made several objections to Local Law 
 
93 Id. at 393. 
94 BROOKHAVEN, N.Y. CODE OF THE TOWN § 85-166(C) (2012), available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/8597756?highlight=85-66; see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.11 (2013). 
95 36 C.F.R  § 28.11(c) (2013). 
96 36 C.F.R. § 28.11(c)(4) (2013). 
97 Brookhaven, N.Y., Introductory Local Law #3 of 2013 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://agendapublic.brookhaven.org/DisplayAgendaPDF.ashx?MeetingID=347. It should 
be noted that the boundaries of the Town of Brookhaven include land on Long Island as 
well as land located on Fire Island. 
98 Id. 
99 See 16 U.S.C § 459e-2(d) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(3). 
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#3.100 The NPS stated that while it was evident that the proposed 
changes were being made for disaster recovery efforts, they still 
needed to be in conformance with the Federal Zoning Standards, 
specifically 36 C.F.R. § 28.11(c)(4), and include that intention.101  
The letter highlights three concerns that the NPS has with the 
proposed change. 
First, the NPS objected to the fact that the amendments would 
allow for impermissible intensifications of nonconforming use.102 
Second, the NPS objected to the ability of Fire Island residents to 
rebuild in the same manner as those located on the mainland section 
of the Town of Brookhaven.103 The NPS noted in the letter that Fire 
Island is geographically and environmentally distinct from the 
mainland and thus subject to additional federal zoning laws.104 
Finally, the NPS found the proposed changes to be inconsistent with 
the 1985 Secretary of the Interior’s approval of the Brookhaven Town 
Code—by allowing for intensification of nonconforming 
development, failing to address the issues of the Coastal Erosions 
Hazards Law, and failing to recognize the implications of the 
uniqueness of Fire Island’s setting within a national park—which is 
premised upon compliance with the Federal Zoning Standard for the 
Seashore.105 These comments were reiterated in a letter dated January 
14 from the Fire Island Superintendent Soller to the Town of 
Brookhaven Commissioner of the Department of Building and Fire 
Prevention, Martin Haley. 106 
Controversy was again present on January 16, when an email from 
Superintendent Soller to Commissioner Haley stated Soller’s approval 
 
100 Letter from K. Christopher Soller, Superintendent of the Fire Island Nat’l Seashore, 
to Edward Romaine, Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven (on file with United States 
Department of the Interior National Park Service Fire Island National Seashore), available 
at http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/upload/Letter_Romaine-TownOfBrookhavenZoning 
_01-07-2013.pdf. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Letter from K. Christopher Soller, Superintendent of the Fire Island Nat’l Seashore, 
to Martin Haley, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Bldgs. & Fire Prevention of the Town of 
Brookhaven (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/upload   
/Letter_Haley-CommentsOnBrookhavenZoning_01-14-2013.pdf. 
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of the proposed amendment, stating that “[t]he final language . . . 
addresses the concerns I raised in my letter of January 7, 2013.”107 
On January 18, a letter from Superintendent Soller to the Town of 
Brookhaven Supervisor and town board members officially notified 
the locality of the NPS comments.108 The letter referenced the draft 
amendment of the code and noted that the draft did not include any of 
the NPS’s proposed changes.109 The letter specifically emphasized 
that the reconstruction allowed by the amendment 
should be tied to a specific situation such as property being severely 
damaged or destroyed by fire or natural disaster as opposed to the 
wholesale tearing down of nonconforming buildings and then 
allowing the rebuilding to previous dimensions without review by 
the Board of Zoning Appeals. The Town’s code is not designed to 
perpetuate nonconforming development, thus reconstruction should 
be limited to instances where reconstruction is not out of choice by 
a homeowner, but rather due to a hardship.110 
The letter closes by noting that without conformance to these 
recommendations, the Town risks losing the Secretary of the 
Interior’s continued approval of the Town of Brookhaven Code.111 
On January 22, 2013, the Brookhaven Town Board held a public 
hearing to discuss, among other items, the proposed amendments to 
the Town of Brookhaven zoning code.112 As expected, prior to and 
during the meeting, the Town Board was presented with various 
objections to the zoning code changes. Several letters were submitted 
in opposition to the proposed amendments from environmental 
groups113 as well as concerned local residents of Fire Island.114 
 
107 E-mail from K. Christopher Soller, Superintendent of the Fire Island Nat’l Seashore, 
to Martin Haley, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Bldgs. & Fire Prevention of the Town of 
Brookhaven  (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:29:25 PM EST) (on file with author). 
108 Letter from K. Christopher Soller, Superintendent of the Fire Island Nat’l Seashore, 
to Edward Romaine, Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven (Jan. 18, 2013) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Soller-Romaine Letter]. 
109 Id.; see Brookhaven, N.Y., supra note 97. 
110 Soller-Romaine Letter, supra note 108; see Brookhaven, N.Y., supra note 97. 
111 Soller-Romaine Letter, supra note 108; see Brookhaven, N.Y., supra note 97. 
112 Brookhaven Town Board, Brookhaven Town Board Meeting Agenda (Jan. 22, 
2013), available at http://agendapublic.brookhaven.org/DisplayAgendaPDF.ashx? 
MeetingID=347. Due to the volume of issues at the meeting, the meeting was reconvened 
on January 23, 2013. 
113 On January 21, 2013, the Group for the East End submitted a letter in opposition to 
the changes. The letter highlighted the necessity for a stringent zoning approval process 
for Fire Island due to the island’s unique environmental character, and noted that the 
proposed amendments are in “direct conflict with the stated objections of the National 
Seashore’s own land use goals.” Letter from Robert S. DeLuca, President, Group for the  
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The story of the Town of Brookhaven highlights many of the flaws 
with the current land use system and identifies the competing interests 
that exist on the seashore. Confusion among the stakeholders and a 
lack of transparency during the local process has created a land use 
scheme that is in need of reform. The system is plagued with both 
inherent and learned enforcement problems as well as a total lack of 
communication between the stakeholders resulting in very little 
transparency. 
Even the federal zoning standards set in place today represent a 
deviation from the original purpose and expected results of the FINS 
Act.115 This deviation has been increasing through a history of 
improper development and an acceptance of the Act’s enforcement 
weaknesses.116 It has been estimated that fifty percent of the 
properties on the seashore are legally nonconforming and twenty-five 
percent are illegally nonconforming uses that were either granted 
improper variances or never went through a land use approval 
process.117 The traditional procedures for executing land use policy, 
such as public hearings and notification requirements, do not 
represent a meaningful forum where all stakeholders can legitimately 
be heard. The Adirondack State Park in New York has a similar 
regional land use scheme and faces similar problems. An examination 
of the Adirondacks will show that even with few collaborative 
methods in place, the land use processes that have become customary 
do not provide meaningful public forums to create consensus-based 
solutions. 
 
East End, to Edward Romaine, Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven (Jan. 21, 2013) (on 
file with author). An opposition letter from Enrico Nardone, Executive Director of Seatuck 
Environmental Association, opposed the amendment because it would allow for “blanket 
approval of certain variance requests,” which would undermine the important role of the 
Board of Zoning Appeals to ensure the goals of the National Seashore and general public, 
including conservation of the island, were considered. Letter from Enrico Nardone, 
Executive Director of Seatuck Envir. Ass’n, to Edward Romaine, Supervisor of the Town 
of Brookhaven (Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with author). 
114 On January 22, 2013, a letter from concerned citizens Thomas Brown and Meg 
Switzgable highlighted the need for federal approval of zoning changes and questioned the 
purpose of the amendments as a response to the destruction of Hurricane Sandy. Letter 
from Thomas Brown and Meg Switzgable, to Edward Romaine, Supervisor of the Town of 
Brookhaven, (Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with author). 
115 NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 68, at 142–43. 
116 Id. 
117 KOPPELMAN & FORMAN, supra note 76, at 134–36. 
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III 
THE HISTORY OF THE ADIRONDACK STATE PARK: THE LAND, THE 
AGENCY, AND THE COMMUNITIES 
While New York has not always sought to protect the Adirondack 
State Park, state legislators decided to create the forest preserve at the 
turn of the nineteenth century.118 It was decided that state lands within 
the park would “be kept forever as wild forest lands.”119 The 1894 
state constitutional convention resulted in this declaration being 
embedded even further into state law when the constitution was 
amended to include: “The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter 
acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall 
be forever kept as wild forest lands.”120 
The question for policymakers became how should the use of land 
within the Adirondack State Park be regulated? The Adirondacks, like 
the Fire Island National Seashore, have local governments and private 
property owners within the boundaries of the park.121 In 1967, 
Laurance Rockefeller, presiding as the chair of the State Council of 
Parks, proposed turning the Adirondacks into a national park.122 Such 
a plan would allow the NPS to acquire 600,000 acres of privately-held 
land within the Adirondacks.123 The plan was met with opposition and 
never gained traction; however, the proposal opened the eyes of state 
policymakers by allowing them to see that private land within the 
Adirondacks was a threat to its own existence.124 Recognizing this 
marble cake of land ownership, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, brother 
 
118 See Louise A. Halper, The Adirondack Park and the Northern Forest: An Essay on 
Preservation and Conservation, 19 VT. L. REV. 335, 342 (1995) (citing 1885 N.Y. Laws 
482). 
119 Id. 
120 N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
121 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2013) (“In the past the Adirondack environment 
has been enhanced by the intermingling of public and private land. A unique pattern of 
private land use has developed which has not only complemented the forest preserve 
holdings but also has provided an outlet for development of supporting facilities necessary 
to the proper use and enjoyment of the unique wild forest atmosphere of the park. This 
fruitful relationship is now jeopardized by the threat of unregulated development on such 
private lands. Local governments in the Adirondack park find it increasingly difficult to 
cope with the unrelenting pressures for development being brought to bear on the area, and 
to exercise their discretionary powers to create an effective land use and development 
control framework.”). 
122 Stacey Lauren Stump, “Forever Wild”: A Legislative Update on New York’s 
Adirondack Park, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 682, 697 (2011). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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of Laurance Rockefeller, decided to study the Adirondacks in an 
attempt to find a solution to the land use and preservation concerns 
that private property presented.125 As a result, in 1970, the Temporary 
Study Commission on the Future of the Adirondacks concluded that 
the natural resources within the Park must be conserved and released 
a report consisting of several recommendations to that end.126 
Following that report, the State recognized that: 
In the past the Adirondack environment has been enhanced by the 
intermingling of public and private land. A unique pattern of private 
land has developed which has not only complemented the forest 
preserve holdings but also has provided an outlet for development 
of supporting facilities necessary to the proper use and enjoyment of 
the unique wild forest atmosphere in the park. This fruitful 
relationship is now jeopardized by the threat of unregulated 
development on such private lands. Local governments in the 
Adirondack park find it increasingly difficult to cope with the 
unrelenting pressures for development being brought to bear on the 
area, and to exercise their discretionary powers to create an 
effective land use and development control framework.127 
The State recognized that local governments feel pressure to 
develop; thus local priorities change, and the motivation to conserve 
natural resources is adversely affected. To mitigate the conflict, New 
York enacted the Adirondack Park Agency Act (APA Act), which 
created the Adirondack Park Agency (APA) and shifted the regulation 
of land to the State, taking local land use control and the associated 
pressures away from local governments in the park.128 
A. The Adirondack Park Agency 
The purpose of the APA is to “insure optimum overall 
conservation, protection, preservation, development and use of the 
unique scenic, aesthetic, wildlife, recreational, open space, historic, 
ecological and natural resources of the Adirondack Park.”129 
Furthermore, the APA is tasked with the regulation of the use of land 
within the park. Consequently, the APA shall create the park’s 
comprehensive plan as well as a land use and development plan, 
 
125 Id. at 697–98. 
126 Stump, supra note 122, at 698. 
127 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2013). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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which regulates the use of private land within park boundaries.130 The 
APA enabling legislation preempts the home rule authority of local 
governments to regulate the use of land.131 The concept behind the 
preemptive approach is to ensure that the Adirondacks are subject to 
comprehensive planning, instead of a mixture of local government 
land use plans that may thwart the State’s conservation and 
preservation interests.132 
In the beginning, state land use regulation faced opposition from 
local governments and Adirondack residents. The constitutionality of 
the APA Act’s ability to abrogate local land use authority was 
challenged in the courts and upheld. In Wambat Realty Corp. v. State 
of New York, the Court of Appeals of New York decided whether the 
APA Act violated the home rule protection that is afforded to local 
governments by the New York State Constitution.133 The court first 
addressed whether the conservation and protection of the Adirondacks 
was a state concern, and therefore the regulation of such was left to 
the State.134 
New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law states that local 
governments may adopt and amend local laws that relate to its 
“property, affairs or government.”135 However, this local home rule 
power is not without limitation. The home rule law is limited by the 
state constitution, which states that the legislature has the power to act 
in relation to “matters other than the property, affairs or government 
of a local government.”136 The question in Wambat became whether 
or not the conservation and preservation of the Adirondack State Park 
was a legitimate state concern and therefore a proper preemption of 
 
130 Id.; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 805 (McKinney 2013) (“The Adirondack park land use and 
development plan us hereby adopted and shall hereafter serve to guide land use planning 
and development throughout the entire area of the Adirondack park, except for those lands 
owned by the state.”). 
131 See Nolon, supra note 4, at 525–27. 
132 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2013). 
133 Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 582 (1977). 
134 Id. at 583. 
135 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1); see also N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Nolon, 
supra note 4, at 511. 
136 N.Y. CONST. Art. IX, § 3 (“(a) Except as expressly provided, nothing in this article 
shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to: (1) The maintenance, 
support or administration of the public school system, as required or provided by article XI 
of this constitution, or any retirement system pertaining to such public school system, (2) 
The courts as required or provided by article VI of this constitution, and (3) Matters other 
than the property, affairs or government of a local government.”). 
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the municipal home rule. The Court of Appeals ruled without doubt 
that: 
the Agency Act prevents localities within the Adirondack Park from 
freely exercising their zoning and planning powers. That indeed is 
its purpose and effect, not because the motive is to impair home 
rule, but because the motive is to serve a supervening State concern 
transcending local interests . . . preserving the priceless Adirondack 
Park through a comprehensive land use and development plan is 
most decidedly a substantial State concern . . . .137 
Wambat upheld the State’s power to create the APA Act and 
allowed the State to preempt the local government regulation of land. 
During this tumultuous time, it was evident that local governments 
were not in favor of the decision.138 In fact, it was noted that most 
local governments within the Adirondack Park sought to abolish the 
APA.139 Furthermore, local government organizations, such as the 
State Supervisors and County Legislators Association, the State 
Organization of County Officers, and the Organization of Villages 
and Towns, lobbied for the repeal of the APA.140 Aside from the 
court’s decision in Wambat, another concern was the lack of 
consultation with local governments during the creation of the land 
use development plan, a land use scheme that they must follow.141 
Residents and local officials felt that planning and land use regulation 
should not be a process left to the State, but should remain intimate 
with local governments.142 The case and the concerns that followed 
represent worries associated with regional governance and losing that 
sense of localism that is deeply rooted in so many communities. 
The largest local complaint was that local governments and 
residents were not particularly gaining from state land use regulation. 
For example, a common question from a resident may be why should 
I bear the burden of preserving the Adirondacks for the benefit of 
 
137 Wambat Realty Corp., 362 N.E.2d at 584–85. 
138 See RICHARD A. LIROFF & G. GORDON DAVIS, PROTECTING OPEN SPACE: LAND 
USE CONTROL IN THE ADIRONDACK PARK 122 (1981) (“In 1975, a pile of manure was 
dumped on the front steps of the Adirondack Park Agency’s headquarters. ‘We’ve taken 
yours for the last three years, now here’s ours’ read the sign planted on top.”). 
139 Id. 
140 HOLLY NELSON & ALAN J. HAHN, STATE POLICY AND LOCAL INFLUENCE IN THE 
ADIRONDACKS 19 (1980); LIROFF & DAVIS, supra note 138, at 122. 
141 LIROFF & DAVIS, supra note 138, at 124. 
142 NELSON & HAHN, supra note 140, at 20. 
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everyone else in the state?143 In addition, the actions of the APA and 
the restrictive land use regulations implemented may have a negative 
effect on the local property tax base due to a lack of development.144 
Early and often, the APA was criticized by local government for its 
review procedures and the tight control it has over the land use 
process. Prior to 1977, not one local government had its land use 
programs approved by the APA, and, as a result, the APA had 
jurisdiction over all development projects.145 Residents did not feel 
there was a need for the APA to have jurisdiction over smaller 
projects, such as single-family dwellings or two-lot subdivisions.146 In 
1976, these smaller applications accounted for more than half of all 
applications submitted to the APA.147 
Opposition brought change to the APA, and in 1975, Governor 
Carey made a strategic move by appointing Robert Flacke as the 
Chairman of the APA.148 Previously, Flacke was the Supervisor for 
the Town of Lake George in the Adirondacks as well as the president 
of Fort William Henry, a major tourist attraction. However, more 
importantly, Flacke was a resident of the park.149 The appointment of 
Flacke was an attempt to put a local face on the APA. 
Once appointed, Flacke did not waste time, and he set in place a 
new initiative to change APA procedures. First, he required that APA 
meetings be open to the public.150 Second, he delegated more project 
reviews to the APA staff, while providing a direct avenue for appeals 
from staff recommendations.151 Third, he sought to rely on more input 
from local governments regarding agency decisions.152 Lastly, Flacke 
noted the importance of establishing a method of collaboration 
between local governments and the APA when making enforcement 
decisions.153 The implementation of these steps occurred quickly 
following Flacke and Governor Carey’s mandate “to develop 
 
143 LIROFF & DAVIS, supra note 138, at 147. 
144 Id. 
145 NELSON & HAHN, supra note 140, at 21. 
146 Id. at 22. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 32. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 33. (Flacke was quoted as saying, “I think we’re going to say to local 
governments, here’s the problem. What’s your solution?”). 
153 Id. 
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‘procedures to improve relations with residents, project sponsors and 
local governments of the Adirondack Park and to give greater 
emphasis to the economic problems of the region.’”154 In his efforts as 
the head of the APA, Flacke sought to break down the barriers and 
eliminate the obstacles that were inherent in a regional scheme. He 
sought to increase the methods of community participation and local 
government engagement, which signified a new era for the APA and 
local government relations. 
Even with this new era of flexibility and collaboration with 
residents, local governments, and project sponsors, the APA was still 
expected to strike a balance between flexible planning and 
environmental conservation. In the 1970s, the APA implemented the 
Local Planning Assistance Section to help communities develop their 
local plans.155 The program’s success was highlighted in 1977 when 
towns started to finish their local land use plans with the help of the 
APA.156 By mid-1979, nine towns had their local land use plans 
approved by the APA and several more were headed in that 
direction.157 
B. The APA and Local Governments: The Road to a Collaborative 
System 
Today, the APA seeks to maintain a balance of flexibility and 
environmental conservation through a collaborative means of land use 
regulation. Early on, the APA recognized that effective land use 
regulations at the state level require “a combination of voluntary 
compliance and the ability to monitor potential violations and enforce 
compliance when infractions occur.”158 Currently, APA legislation 
and regulations seek to implement this combination of voluntary 
compliance with regulatory enforcement through the local land use 
program and other procedures. Adding to the collaborative efforts of 
the APA and the desire to involve local governments and residents, 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 34. 
156 Id. at 35. 
157 Id. (“[As of 1979, p]lanning elements were completed in 33 communities but had 
not yet been submitted to the APA. Sixty-nine out of 107 town and villages in the park, 
representing three-fourths of the park area’s population, had requested and received 
assistance from the agency. Of these that had not, most had their own pre-APA plans or 
controls in effect.”). 
158 Id. at 38. 
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the APA Act created the Local Government Review Board, which 
acts as a consultant throughout APA procedures, reviews, and 
rulemaking. These two collaborative mechanisms are examples of 
how the APA and the State have encouraged and integrated flexibility 
and collaboration while regulating the use of land within the 
Adirondack Park. The process is an attempt to capture the much 
needed, and sought after, advantages of localism by incorporating 
local concerns and interests within the regional goals and decisions. 
1. The Local Land Use Program and Agency Review 
The Local Land Use Program is an example of how the APA seeks 
to work with local governments, allowing them some control over 
their land use decisions, while maintaining proper oversight and 
enforcement to ensure conservation.159 The APA Act states: 
The agency is authorized to review and approve any local land use 
program proposed by a local government and formally submitted by 
the legislative body of the local government to the agency for 
approval . . . [T]he agency shall review the local land use program 
and approve or disapprove it, or approve it subject to conditions.160 
The local plan shall be in conformance with certain criteria laid out 
by state law and APA regulations; for example, the local land use 
plan must be “in furtherance and supportive of the land use and 
development plan.”161 
When reviewing the local plans, the APA shall consult with 
various entities. For instance, the APA is required to consult with 
appropriate public agencies and furthermore must ask the local 
government review board and regional planning associations to 
comment on the local land use programs being considered.162 More 
importantly, the APA shall “encourage and assist local governments 
in the preparation of local land use programs.”163 
 
159 N.Y. STATE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY, APA APPROVED LOCAL LAND USE 
PROGRAM INFORMATION SHEET (2011), available at http://www.apa.ny.gov/Local 
_Government/LGS/ALLUP_Info_Sheet.pdf. 
160 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 807(1) (McKinney 2013). 
161 See id. § 807(2)(a); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 582.2-582.4 
(2013). The land use and development plan will be discussed later in the article but is the 
guiding document for all land use planning and development within the entire state park, 
including state and private land and created by the APA. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 805. 
162 N.Y. Exec. Law § 807(2)(g)(6) (McKinney 2013). 
163 Id. § 807(2)(g)(7) (“The [APA] shall encourage and assist local governments in the 
preparation of local land use programs, including the provision of data, technical 
assistance and model provisions. Such model provisions shall be made available by the  
GOTTLIEB (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/13  9:20 AM 
2014] Regional Land Use Planning: A Collaborative 65 
Solution for the Conservation of Natural Resources 
Local governments, pursuant to the municipal home rule law, shall 
have the authority to regulate preexisting land use or development or 
any pre-filed subdivision plat.164 However, new development projects 
are divided into two classifications: Class A and Class B.165 Local 
governments with APA-approved land use plans will retain 
jurisdiction over the review of Class B projects.166 Conversely, the 
review of all Class A projects are completely within the jurisdiction 
of the APA, with consultation and collaboration from local 
governments and agencies.167 The APA also retains jurisdiction over 
Class B projects that are not governed by an APA-approved local land 
use plan.168 This process is very different from how the NPS regulates 
the use of land on the Fire Island National Seashore. In this model, 
the APA is the main permitting authority and may delegate that 
authority to local governments with approved codes. Conversely, on 
Fire Island, the NPS is not the permitting agency and furthermore 
does not have such strict control over local government codes; it is 
merely a stakeholder in the process. The APA model allows for strict 
land use regulation by the APA, but does not completely circumvent 
the local land use process. This allows local governments to retain 
some control and is a means of incorporating the advantages of 
localism, such as increased democratic processes and a strong sense 
of community. 
 
agency as soon as possible after the effective date of the adoption of the land use and 
development plan.”). 
164 Id. § 807(2)(g). 
165 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 572 (2013); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§§ 810(1)–(2). While each classification is described in great detail in the implementing 
legislation, a few examples can be identified to highlight the differences. Classification of 
a project as A or B depends on size, intensity, and location. The APA Act explains how 
different projects within the various land use classifications (described in the Land Use 
and Development Plan) may alter whether the project is Class A or B, classifications 
include: hamlets, moderate intensity use, low intensity use, rural use, resource 
management, and industrial use. When designating these uses the APA relied on existing 
land use patterns, physical limitations (slopes, soils, and elevation), unique natural features 
(waterfalls and gorges), biological and ecological considerations (habitats, wetlands, 
vegetation, etc.), and public considerations such as historical sites, community character, 
and open space. From these land use classifications the legislature proscribed Class A and 
B projects. See id. 
166 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 809, 810(2) (McKinney 2013). 
167 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 809(1) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 9, § 573.1 (2013). 
168 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 809(1) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 9, § 573.1 (2013). 
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In effect, the Act transfers land use regulation for Class B projects 
from the APA to the towns. Upon the application of a Class B project 
in a local government with an approved plan, the local government 
must provide the APA with notice.169 After such notice is given, the 
APA has standing to participate in the local review process and a 
challenge under article 78 caused by an issuance or non-issuance.170 
As a part of this transfer, local governments with approved plans may 
also regulate variances from shoreline restrictions.171 
The APA is not without monitoring control over local 
governments, their land use programs, and Class B projects. After 
consulting with the Adirondack Local Government Review Board, the 
APA shall have the jurisdiction to revoke its approval of certain local 
government land use programs as well as reexamine Class B projects. 
The agency may determine by a two-thirds vote that the local 
government having jurisdiction has “repeatedly or frequently failed or 
refused, after due notice and requests from the agency . . . to 
administer or enforce the approved local land use program to 
adequately carry out the policies, purposes and objectives of the 
approved program or of the land use and development plan.”172 This 
veto power is absent on Fire Island and represents a process whereby 
the regional authority can ensure that regional goals are being 
achieved through the designated local processes. 
In circumstances where the APA has jurisdiction over the project, 
collaboration with local agencies still exists. The APA has the 
authority to review and approve all Class A projects as well as all 
Class B projects that are not located within a local government with a 
valid or approved local land use program.173 During this review 
process, the application and related information is shared with several 
local government bodies.174 Upon receipt of an application for such a 
project, a brief description of the project shall be provided to the 
Local Government Review Board, the chair of involved county 
planning boards, the chair of the involved regional county planning 
board, and certain officials on applicable local government planning 
 
169 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 808(2) (McKinney 2013). 
170 Id. 
171 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 582.1(a)(1) (2013). 
172 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 808(4) (McKinney 2013). 
173 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 809(1) (McKinney 2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, 
§ 573.1 (2013). 
174 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 809(2)(a) (McKinney 2013). 
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boards where the project is proposed.175 The determination whether or 
not to hold a public hearing is made based on APA evaluations or 
local government review board comments that suggest the project 
may be disapproved or will only be approved with conditions.176 The 
Local Government Review Board shall have the ability to issue 
advisory comments on all projects being reviewed by the APA.177 
Local governments with approved plans have the ability to hear 
applications requesting certain variances from the local land use plan, 
and upon the receipt of an application, the local governing body shall 
give written notice to the APA.178 If the variance is granted by the 
local governing body, it will not take effect for thirty days, during 
which time the APA may determine that the variance was not granted 
with the proper statutory basis of “practical difficulties or unnecessary 
hardships.”179 If the APA makes this determination, it has the 
authority to reverse the local decision to grant the variance.180 If such 
a reversal occurs, the parties shall have standing to challenge the APA 
decision in court during an Article 78 proceeding.181 
These many checks and balances most certainly represent 
enforcement measures that are lacking on Fire Island and that are 
required during any regional land use scheme. It is a form of 
enforcement against local governments that is necessary for the 
proper functioning of a regional authority. The regional authority, the 
APA, is able to ensure its goals are being met through constant 
oversight. Meanwhile, local governments are provided with legal and 
legitimate ways to incorporate their concerns into the planning 
process while maintaining a strong sense of community and identity. 
In theory, this is designed to encourage local governments to 
participate in the APA model instead of deviating from the system, a 
trend that is present on the Fire Island National Seashore. 
 
175 Id. 
176 Id. § 809(3)(d). 
177 Id. § 809(4). 
178 Id. § 808(2) (This applies to all local governments in the Adirondack State Park with 
approved local land use plan, except in Hamlets.). 
179 Id. § 808(3). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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2. The Adirondack Local Government Review Board 
The Adirondack Local Government Review Board (Review Board) 
plays a key role in APA review procedures. In 1973, the New York 
Legislature created the Review Board to “assist[] the Adirondack park 
agency in carrying out its functions, powers, and duties.”182 The 
Review Board is to consist of twelve members, each a resident of one 
county within the park, appointed by their respective local 
governments.183 The core functions of the Review Board are to (1) 
monitor the administration and enforcement of the Adirondack Park 
land use and development plan and periodically report, and (2) make 
recommendations concerning the land use and development plan to 
the governor, the legislature, and county legislators from the affected 
counties.184 
The creation of the Review Board came at a time when local 
residents were feeling detached from the APA and its policies.185 As 
such, the Review Board initially consisted of agency critics who 
many believed were the voice for developers.186 The Review Board 
seemed pro-development at the time because the agency had appeared 
to abandon the concept of local economic development in the face of 
conservation, and the Review Board sought to reverse this notion.187 
The sentiment of the Review Board members reflected that of all 
residents in the park: that the restrictive measures placed by the APA 
were a concern for local tax revenues.188 This conflict directly reflects 
the classic debate between localism and regionalism. Local 
governments needed a forum to voice their concerns for inclusion in 
the regional process, and the creation of the Review Board provided 
such a forum. The Review Board indicates that local government 
should be involved in the regulation of local Adirondack lands and 
that local involvement is beneficial during the planning process. 
However, project review through the APA is an arduous task and is 
inundated with delays and a lack of transparency. The problems with 
the APA process are best described through an analysis of a recent 
 
182 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 803-a(1) (McKinney 2013). 
183 Id. (“No more than one member shall be a resident of any single county.”). 
184 Id. § 803-a(7). 
185 LIROFF & DAVIS, supra note 140, at 130. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
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development in the Adirondacks that seeks to increase the economic 
development in a suffering community. 
3. Recent Major Development: The Adirondack Club and Resort 
Recently, controversy has surrounded the Town of Tupper Lake, 
New York, where developers have taken on a decade-long battle to 
build the Adirondack Club and Resort.189 The Adirondack Club and 
Resort is the largest development the APA has ever approved and 
includes more than 650 units of housing, a hotel, a ski area, a marina, 
and an equestrian center all on 6,300 acres of land.190 The Town 
Supervisor has stated that “without something happening . . . we’re 
going to be a ghost town.”191 This is because, like most Adirondack 
towns, Tupper Lake is plagued with a depressed economy and in need 
of economic development. In response to this need for economic 
development, the APA voted ten-to-one to approve the project, but 
included strict conditions.192 The permit conditions include an earth-
hued color scheme, minimal vegetation clearing, downcast lighting, 
eighty-five percent of property left in its natural state, and 4,740 acres 
reserved as backcountry resource management land.193 However, 
these permit conditions were unconvincing to local environmental 
groups that oppose the project and are fighting the approvals in state 
court. 
Protect the Adirondacks! and the Sierra Club have joined forces 
with some local residents to file a lawsuit against the State of New 
York over the approval procedure concerning the Adirondack Club 
and Resort. The lawsuit challenges the APA’s approval and argues 
that “APA officials kowtowed to the developer’s wishes, burying 
information detrimental to the project and even letting outsiders 
rewrite its work.”194 The 146-page complaint sets forth several 
 
189 Lisa W. Foderaro, In the Adirondacks, Joy and Fear Over What a Resort May 
Bring, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/nyregion/in            
-struggling-tupper-lake-resort-project-creates-rift.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Jonathan Monfiletto & Doug Buchanan, APA Gives OK to Tupper Lake Resort 
Project, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.watertowndailytimes 
.com/article/20120120/NEWS09/120129996. 
193 Foderaro, supra note 189. 
194 Hart Seely, In the Adirondacks, a Development Battle Pits Neighbor Against 
Neighbor, POST-STANDARD (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf 
/2012/09/tupper_lake_development_projec.html. 
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allegations as to the APA process, including that the agency staff 
allowed the developer to write the permit and that the public, APA 
members, and other parties to the matter lacked proper notifications 
during the process.195 Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the 
APA did not have enough ecological information about the 
development nor did it request the studies necessary to approve the 
permit.196 The development itself has created friction within the 
community, and this new lawsuit has exacerbated the tension. Some 
view this lawsuit as frivolous and a waste of taxpayers’ money while 
others feel the suit is necessary to ensure transparency and 
accountability is a part of the APA process. 197 
The controversy over the Adirondack Club and Resort represents a 
shift whereby the APA is more sympathetic to the economic needs 
and concerns of the local government. Nonetheless, local 
environmental groups have sparked conflict and delayed the project, 
resulting in costly litigation. A solution to the delay and controversy 
may be reforming the regional land use scheme to install an even 
more collaborative process. While collaborative measures between 
local governments and the APA are in place, a more comprehensive 
collaborative process is needed to increase transparency and 
consensus-based land use decisions that will avoid costly litigation. 
The case of the Adirondacks is distinct from Fire Island for many 
reasons. Most notably, the APA has taken a more hard-lined approach 
when dealing with local governments and their ability to regulate the 
use of land, but it still seeks to ensure that they play a role in the 
process.198 For instance, most permitting is done through the APA or 
an APA-approved mechanism. Conversely, on Fire Island, local 
governments and the NPS seem to be working separately and 
distinctly from one another, causing a lack of conservation and no 
accountability. Each case study would benefit from collaborative 
 
195 Id.; see Complaint, In re Protect the Adirondacks! Inc., v. Adirondack Park Agency, 
969 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (No. 1682-12) (Mar. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.protectadks.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/PetitionC.pdf. 
196 Complaint, supra note 195, at 3. 
197 See Jim LaValley & Bob Glennon, Is the Law Suit Over Tupper Resort Frivolous?, 
ADIRONDACK EXPLORER, July/Aug. 2012, available at http://www.protectadks.org/wp     
-content/uploads/2012/07/AdirondackExplorerAPA-ACRDebate7.12.pdf. 
198 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2013) (“A further purpose of this article is to 
focus the responsibility for developing long-range park policy in a forum reflecting 
statewide concern. This policy shall recognize the major state interest in the conservation, 
use and development of the park’s resources and the preservation of its open space 
character, and at the same time, provide a continuing role for local government.”). 
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decision-making processes because they encourage transparency, 
accountability, and create consensus-based decisions that all 
stakeholders will be comfortable following. 
IV 
CONSTRUCTING A COLLABORATIVE LAND USE SCHEME: 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND COLLABORATIVE 
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Cooperative federalism is referred to as a collaborative process that 
suggests “governmental actors [are] engaged in negotiated 
cooperation within multiple and interdependent networks.”199 This 
notion requires the various levels of government to work together 
instead of working separately.200 There are several benefits to 
implementing a cooperative and collaborative process. First, 
cooperative federalism brings diverse perspectives to the table, 
allowing for multiple solutions to address policy concerns.201 Second, 
collaboration promotes open dialogue between the stakeholders and 
the sharing of information for collaborative solutions.202 Third, 
collaborative federalism fosters redundancy and thus acts as a 
safeguard for the promotion of a particular policy.203 Lastly, with 
various stakeholders collaborating, accountability and transparency is 
present in all regulatory procedures.204 Furthermore, when various 
levels of governments are involved, excessive influence from interest 
groups is tamed, which leads to well-thought-out decisions.205 
Cooperative federalism and regional governance go hand-in-hand. 
Scholars suggest that three forms of regional government exist. The 
first is the formation of regional units without the disruption of local 
government power to address regional concerns.206 The second 
 
199 Denise Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federalism and 
Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 69, 70 (2005); see also Benjamin K. 
Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal 
Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 448–49 
(2008). 
200 Sovacool, supra note 199, at 442–48. 
201 Id. at 448-49. 
202 Id. at 449. 
203 Id. at 450. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Parlow, supra note 10, at 63-64. 
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“involves preserving local power but allowing for a radical 
reformulation of how local government may exercise their various 
powers.”207 The last creates a regional government that is in charge of 
ensuring that regional policies are achieved and that local decisions 
are not adverse.208 From these three models, many different structures 
have emerged. Old regionalism represents a structure in which all 
decisions are made at the regional level and local government 
autonomy is absent.209 This model does not represent a best practice 
because it does not allow for collaboration between government 
stakeholders and therefore will not preserve the advantages of 
localism. 
In the case of the Fire Island National Seashore, the NPS is a 
regional system that can best be described as not completely 
circumventing the local process, but uniquely mandating federal 
standards without any enforcement power to ensure compliance. This 
combination of regional concepts is a detriment to the conservation of 
the national seashore because local governments act separately in 
pursuit of local goals. On the other hand, within the Adirondack State 
Park, the APA has been granted extensive enforcement power over 
local government land use practices, but it maintains a sense of local 
participation that has preserved some local autonomy. While the APA 
processes are able to control the negative externalities created by 
individual local actions, the regional authority has been accused of 
lacking transparency and therefore is in need of collaborative 
methods. 
For regionalism to be successful, localities must feel as though 
local concerns are considered during the advancement of regional 
goals. Vital to this concept are active local governments and 
community engagement in regional decisions. In the past, this trend 
has been identified as “new regionalism,” which varies depending on 
the regional and local concerns. The consolidation model suggests 
that one regional government should be created to address problems 
that transcend local governments.210 This structure is suggested to 
solve the problem of fragmentation that local governments create, 
which adversely impacts the conservation of large parklands.211 The 
 
207 Id. at 64. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 64–65. 
211 See id. at 65. 
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multitiered model suggests that different levels of government should 
handle the problems for which they are best situated.212 The linked 
functions approach and the complex networks approach do not 
require a regional governing authority, but encourage inter-municipal 
agreements and the sharing of services between localities.213 
The inclusion of local governments in the regional process is a 
pillar of the new regionalism approach. As such, it has been noted that 
[m]odern regional initiatives should be achieved through voluntary 
collaboration as opposed to the creation of general-purpose 
metropolitan governments that supplant local authority. New 
regionalism’s normative goals are similar to those at the heart of 
local government law: “(1) equity and inclusion within, and 
amongst, self-defined territorial communities; (2) democratic 
participation; and (3) efficient and accountable government.” 
Unlike unbridled localism, new regionalists argue that institutional 
arrangements and regulatory schemes must promote benefits within 
a region as a whole as opposed to individual localities within a 
metropolitan region. By advocating for voluntary collaboration 
among localities on a regional level, new regionalism addresses 
localism’s “failure to: (1) resolve cross-border, multi-issue 
challenge; (2) promote regional equity amongst independent 
localities; and (3) foster participation and collaboration across local 
boundaries.”214 
The concept of new regionalism can be taken a step further and 
break free from the traditional forms of public participation that have 
proven to be ineffective.215 Legislation that enables regional land use 
authorities should require collaborative forms of decision making to 
engage localities in regional decisions. 
Both the APA and the NPS represent regional land use schemes 
that have altered the autonomy of local governments. The NPS, and 
 
212 Id. at 65–66 (“Under this approach, independent local governments might be 
responsible for providing police and fire services, while the broader regional government 
might deal with transboundary issues such as transportation.”). 
213 Id. at 66–67. 
214 Bush, supra note 37, at 226–27; see also Parlow, supra note 10, at 65 (“The new 
regionalist approach thus seeks to harness existing local governments and encourage and 
spur cooperation among them in a manner that benefits the entire region.”). 
215 See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO 
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 242–43 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 
2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE]; Patricia E. Salkin & Charles 
Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of 
the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 
768 (2012). 
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the corresponding land use process on Fire Island, is an example of a 
regional authority with weak enforcement power that has not 
attempted to collaborate with local governments. As a result, local 
governments maintain autonomy and are rebelling against the NPS, 
adverse to regional goals. Conversely, the APA is a stronger model 
whereby the regional authority has more control over the actions of 
involved local governments. In an attempt to not strip away all local 
autonomy, the APA has implemented some collaborative methods; 
however, more integrated and nontraditional collaborative methods 
will prove beneficial. The following Sections will introduce 
procedures for collaborative decision making that should be included 
in all regional land use processes. 
A. Engaging the Stakeholder: Collaborative Land Use and 
Environmental Policy 
Public participation is a core principle in any government action. 
This is especially true in the field of land use regulation. Public 
participation for land use processes is usually authorized by the 
enabling legislation, which allows an entity to regulate the use of 
land.216 Parties are numerous and might include the developer, 
residents, community members, and government agencies. If, instead 
of applying the traditional adversarial approach to land use decisions, 
the affected parties embraced the notions of collaboration, a more 
efficient system would prevail. 
The traditional land use and administrative process has remained 
stagnant over the years and includes an application or proposed 
rulemaking, notice of the application or proposed rulemaking, a 
public comment period, and a final decision. As a rule, the 
government is the decision maker for any land use or rulemaking 
decision, and the parties participate through a trial-like process where 
arguments can be heard.217 A recognized flaw is an inherent 
psychological difficulty for adversarial parties to work constructively 
towards a mutual solution.218 In essence, the process becomes a battle 
based on misinformation and a fear of losing. Therefore, parties spend 
a large amount of time and money in an attempt to gain an advantage 
over the other.219 Professor Sean Nolon states that: 
 
216 Nolon, supra note 21, at 108. 
217 Id. at 113. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. 
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Once embroiled in a controversy, parties rarely see past their 
differences and their interactions take on a combative and 
competitive tone. They view each other as the archetypal foe: 
developers as rapacious, greedy and deceitful, officials as 
incompetent, corrupt and unresponsive and opponents as parochial, 
hypocritical and untrustworthy. The overwhelming sense is that 
there is no common ground and the only option is to prepare for 
battle and hope for a quick victory by defeating the other side.220 
The traditional method that is used to regulate the use of land must 
be reformed to eliminate such a distrustful process. Public 
participation and more collaborative methods have the ability to open 
the dialogue between parties involved in the “battle” and allow for 
more thorough, creative, and universally-accepted land use decisions. 
Arguably the most important and deeply-rooted element of the 
traditional process is public notice, where the public is placed on 
notice of a land use application or a proposed administrative action 
and has the chance to respond.221 Public notice and comment 
requirements are the conventional forms of public participation in 
environmental law; however, scholars note that “methods of public 
notice and comment periods in environmental law are ineffective 
because there is no requirement that the decisions making deliberate 
in any meaningful way over the public comments.”222 Consequently, 
the public comment periods have evolved into a “decide, announce, 
and defend” process, where the governmental decision maker has 
more than likely reached an internal decision, which is presented to 
the public for comment and then defended against those comments.223 
This evolved process leaves no room to fully engage the public in the 
formulation of policy.224 This lack of dialogue creates “a poor forum 
for extensive development of information, a shared baseline of 
 
220 Id. at 127. 
221 Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting 
Wind Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 355 (2011) (“The National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and the Toxic Release Inventory are a few examples of laws that have increased 
opportunities for citizen input and have increased transparency.”). 
222 Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 215; see ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 215, 
at 242–43. 
223 John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory 
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 908 (1998). 
224 Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 215, at 768. 
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understanding, and the development of a consensus,” which are key 
components to any collaborative process.225 
Collaborative public participation techniques are not a substitute 
for required public participation procedures, but should be coupled 
with the traditional forms of participation mandated by enabling 
legislation.226 The models that are discussed below include 
participatory planning, citizen advisory groups, and negotiated 
rulemaking. Each has its own application and can provide benefits to 
certain land use debates. The Fire Island and Adirondack Park case 
studies each present different circumstances where the collaborative 
process can be incorporated, or improved upon, to allow for 
meaningful public participation that will enhance conservation efforts 
and the relationship between all levels of government and the 
community. 
1. Participatory Planning and Community Advisory Groups 
Participatory planning seeks to engage community members to 
serve an advisory role during important land use policy decisions in 
their community.227 During the participatory planning process, the 
community member advisors are not meant to reach a conclusion or 
policy decision concerning the debated policy, but they are expected 
to identify the various priorities that exist throughout the broad reach 
of community members participating.228 This process has been used to 
accumulate information on financial and natural resource 
management, to create energy goals, and to allow underprivileged 
populations to take part in policy decision making.229 
 
225 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 215, at 243 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 215, at 768. 
226 See Nolon, supra note 21, at 113–14 (“Unfortunately, parties typically assume that 
required processes cannot be supplemented because they equate ‘required’ with 
‘exclusive.’ While the required process does specify what a board must do in order to 
make a decision, the required process imposes a minimum, not a maximum. The 
government must hold a public hearing, the applicant must notify adjacent property 
owners, and the government must make a decision within a given time frame. These 
mandates do not bar the government from suggesting or requiring additional procedures in 
appropriate circumstances.”). 
227 Nolon, supra note 221, at 357 (“Participatory planning refers to practices that 
engage citizens to serve a central advisory role in making important and often complicated 
policy decisions that do not require specified technical experience or knowledge.”). 
228 Id. at 358. 
229 Id. at 357–58. 
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Similarly, community advisory groups are gaining more and more 
attention, especially in the field of environmental justice where 
disadvantaged community members are in need of a more engaged 
platform to voice their concerns.230 It is suggested that community 
advisory groups can be created through statute or agency rules that 
mandate stakeholders of a particular conflict over a governmental 
decision collaborate on the issue to flesh out possible solutions.231 The 
decision-making body shall choose stakeholders that have the greatest 
interest in the specific matter.232 As with any collaborative roundtable 
discussion, the members should include government officials, local 
residents, property owners, advocates, businessmen, and, more 
importantly, technical experts when the situation is of a highly 
technical nature.233 
The actual deliberations of the advisory committee should be more 
involved than the traditional public hearing type of public 
participation. An advisory group should actively deliberate and 
communicate with each other in an open forum to develop a 
resolution based on common grounds.234 Whether or not a consensus 
is formed during group discussions, a community advisory group can 
still be successful by narrowing the issues, highlighting stakeholder 
concerns not otherwise considered, compiling a list of possible 
solutions to work from, and identifying areas where solutions 
presently exist.235 
Advisory groups and committees can come in many different 
forms, but they should always be tailored to the task at issue.236 
Diversity is important when forming an advisory group in the context 
 
230 See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 217, at 767. 
231 See id. at 768; see also Applegate, supra note 225, at 921. 
232 See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 217; see also Applegate, supra note 225, at 921. 
233 Shelia Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 479 (2002). 
234 Id. 
235 Applegate, supra note 225, at 921. 
236 Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 217, at 770. (“Many jurisdictions employ the use of 
advisory committees in various forms, and it is important to understand the context in 
which they were created, who appointed the members, and exactly what their charge or 
mission is. For example, some committees may consist of a small group of people selected 
by public officials with unknown motives (e.g., they could have been selected for 
independent expertise or they could have been selected for more partisan reasons). 
Advisory Committees may conduct deliberations in public or behind closed doors, and 
they may or may not seek to employ methods to engage broader public input to inform 
their deliberations or ultimate recommendations.”). 
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of a regional land use decision that has several different interested 
parties. Diversity can mean cultural, geographic, or political, but, 
most importantly, all interested parties must be involved or 
represented in the collaborative proceedings. 
In the case of the APA, the Local Government Review Board sits 
as an advisory review committee. They are enabled to act as advisors 
to development decisions as well as to the future of the land use 
development plan. The APA seeks their input as they represent local 
government constituents. The Local Government Review Board 
provides an avenue for local governments to be heard at the regional 
level. Local governments are therefore represented as part of the 
decision-making process, and they do not seem as distant from the 
regional authority. 
The goal of these committees is to engage in consensus-building 
discussions and tear down the walls that block transparency. The 
result should include regulatory conformance, reduction of costly 
litigation, and assurance that the regional authority is accountable for 
its actions. During the approval process for the Adirondack Club and 
Resort, if all stakeholders, and not just the Review Board, had been 
involved as advisory groups, the decade-long process may have been 
expedited. Additionally, the lawsuit against the APA alleging 
transparency concerns would have been avoided. This collaborative 
method, if employed as best practices, would make the process truly 
transparent by involving all stakeholders at the early stages and 
providing them a meaningful forum. Such participation would be 
outside of and in addition to the traditional public comment 
procedures. 
A local government review committee, or a review committee of 
any stakeholder group, is absent on Fire Island. As a result, local 
governments, such as the Town of Brookhaven, are distant and 
uncommunicative with the NPS. If this were not the case, local 
governments would not feel the need to rebel against federal 
regulations, which are designed to conserve the national park. 
Creating this avenue for local government representatives, among 
other stakeholders, opens up the lines of communication and eases 
tensions between the parties. Such a participatory planning tactic is a 
best practice for a regional land use scheme that seeks to preserve the 
benefits of localism while curbing land use practices adverse to the 
regional goals. 
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2. Negotiated Rulemaking 
Negotiated rulemaking is a collaborative process that invites 
affected parties into the policymaking arena. The process is designed 
to supplement the required process for administrative rulemaking 
typically prescribed by the State’s Administrative Procedure Act. 237 
By allowing stakeholders of a proposed rule to engage in roundtable 
discussions, a more legally defensible and thorough rule or decision 
will result, avoiding the pitfalls of future challenges.238 If all affected 
parties can reach an agreement, then each stakeholder group is 
seemingly represented in the decision, assuming each party is 
properly identified, which lowers the chances of an unfavorable rule 
and increases the probability of compliance.239 
Professor Philip Harter notes that the true value of negotiated 
rulemaking is not merely efficiency in the process with less time to 
promulgate a rule, nor is it less litigation, but the ability of 
participants to directly immerse themselves in the actual substance of 
the rule connecting them to the end result. Professor Harter stated in 
his recommendations to the Administrative Conference of the United 
States that: 
Negotiating has many advantages over the adversarial process. The 
parties participate directly and immediately in the decision. They 
share in its development and concur with it, rather than 
“participate” by submitting information that the decisionmaker 
considers in reaching the decision. Frequently, those who 
participate in the negotiation are closer to the ultimate 
decisionmaking authority of the interest they represent than 
traditional intermediaries that represent the interest in an adversarial 
proceeding. Thus, participants in negotiations can make substantive 
decisions, rather than acting as experts in the decisionmaking 
process. In addition, negotiation can be a less expensive means of 
 
237 Nolon, supra note 221, at 358. 
238 See id. at 359. 
239 Id. (“The nature of this negotiation is drastically different than the nature of the 
formal rule making process because the parties have an opportunity to talk to each other 
instead of directing all comments through the agency. They can share information about 
what is important to them and what is not. They are free to collectively explore and 
evaluate different regulatory possibilities. If all the parties can reach agreement, then the 
text of their rule becomes the proposed rule that is then subject to the required regulatory 
process.”). 
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decisionmaking because it reduces the need to engage in defensive 
research in anticipation of arguments made by adversaries.240 
While this notion is contested,241 at birth, negotiated rulemaking 
was designed to produce rules based on the consensus of all the 
affected parties.242 
Advocates of the process encourage negotiated rulemaking and 
find that it is incredibly successful in appropriate circumstances, 
especially in highly-polarized conflicts.243 Factors that should be 
taken into consideration when an agency is contemplating the need 
for a negotiated rule include “the opportunity for trade-offs among 
parties, the level of conflict, and the importance of gathering 
information from affected parties, among others.”244 
In 1990, the federal government realized the potential for 
negotiated rulemaking and enacted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act.245 
The purpose of the Act is to “establish a framework for the conduct of 
negotiated rulemaking . . . [and] to encourage agencies to use the 
 
240 Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 53 (2000) (citing Philip J. Harter, Negotiating 
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982)). 
241 Professor Harter’s 2000 article was a response to Professor Cary Coglianese’s 
critical examination of negotiated rulemaking process. Professor Cary Coglianese 
evaluated the process keeping its two principal goals in mind: (1) to reduce the time it 
takes for an agency to promulgate a rule, and (2) to lessen the amount of judicial 
challenges that result. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and 
Performance of Negotiated Rule Making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1259 (1997). Professor 
Coglianese found that while the promise of negotiated rulemaking is attractive, the process 
is not living up to its promise of a quicker administrative process with fewer judicial 
challenges. Id. at 1334. In response Professor Harter states that 
Coglianese’s research is significantly flawed and therefore misleading concerning 
the actual experience with negotiated rulemaking. Using as illustrations several 
negotiated rules citied by Coglianese in his research, [my] Article argues that 
Coglianese misapplies his own methodology, incorrectly measures the duration of 
several negotiations, and fails to differentiate among different types of judicial 
challenges to negotiated rules. 
Harter, supra note 240, at 32. 
242 Harter, supra note 240, at 52. (“Coglianese argues throughout his article that the 
advocates of negotiated rules believed that the primary benefits of reg-neg are the 
reduction in both the time to reach a final rule and the incidence of litigation. While both 
benefits have been realized, neither was perceived by those who established the process as 
the predominant factor motivating its use. 
243 Id. at 38. 
244 Nolon, supra note 221, at 360. 
245 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2012). 
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process when it enhances the informal rulemaking process.”246 The 
first step is to determine whether negotiated rulemaking is the 
appropriate process for the proposed rule by examining several 
factors.247 Relevant factors include whether there is an actual need for 
the rule, the number of identifiable interests involved, whether a 
negotiated rulemaking committee could properly represent all 
affected parties, whether a consensus is probable, whether an 
unreasonable delay in promulgation will occur as a result of 
negotiations, whether proper agency resources are available, and 
whether, to the extent legally possible, the agency will use the 
consensus as the proposed rule.248 
Once an agency has decided to trigger the negotiated rulemaking 
process, all stakeholders are placed on notice through the Federal 
Register.249 The public notice shall include a description of the scope 
and subject of the rule, a list of interests that may be impacted, a list 
of proposed people selected to represent those interests, and a 
description of how other interested parties can apply to the negotiated 
 
246 Id. § 561. Furthermore, it is noted in the act that the law should not limit innovation 
and experimentation with negotiated rulemaking or any other creative rulemaking process 
that may be authorized by law. Id. 
247 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(1)–(7) (2012). 
248 Id. Past negotiated rulemaking examples include the Federal Aviation and the 
National Park Service using the process to promulgate regulations concerning the ability 
of planes to travel over national parks for sightseeing purposes. Harter, supra note 241, at 
37. The Department of Transportation entered into negotiations for the promulgation of 
rules relating to the delivery of compressed gases, after previous attempts were slowed by 
litigation. Id. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration applied the process 
when writing rules for erected steel structures, a proposed rule that had been delayed for 
decades. Id. at 37–38. Finally, the U.S. Forest Service promulgation of policies to address 
the placement of rock climbing fixtures in wilderness areas sought the help of a negotiated 
process. Id. 
2495 U.S.C. § 564(a) (2012). For persons who believe that they are significantly 
impacted by the proposed rule and feel as though their interests are not represented in the 
committee, they may apply for a position on the committee or appoint a participant to 
represent their interests. When a party makes such an application it must include: 
(1) the name of the applicant or nominee and a description of the interests such 
person shall represent; (2) evidence that the applicant or nominee is authorized to 
represent parties related to the interests the person proposes to represent; (3) a 
written commitment that the applicant or nominee shall actively participate in good 
faith in the development of the rule under consideration; and (4) the reasons that the 
persons specified in the notice under subsection (a)(4) do not adequately represent 
the interests of the person submitting the application or nomination. 
Id. § 564(b). 
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rulemaking committee.250 Under the federal scheme, membership of 
the committee is limited to twenty-five members unless the agency 
decides more members are necessary to ensure the presence of all 
stakeholders.251 If the committee reaches a consensus, then a report 
containing the proposed rule shall be delivered to the agency that 
established the committee.252 
Aside from federal legislation, several states have enacted similar 
laws seeking to promote the use of this innovative rulemaking 
process. Texas,253 Nebraska,254 Florida,255 and Montana256 have 
enacted negotiated rulemaking laws seeking to construct a framework 
for the process statewide. The promotion of negotiated rulemaking on 
 
250 Id. 
251 Id. § 565(b). 
252 Id. § 566(f). 
253 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2008.001-.058 (West 2011). 
254 NEB. REV. STAT. § 84.921-.932 (2012). 
The purpose of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act is to establish a framework for the 
conduct of negotiated rulemaking consistent with the Administrative Procedure 
Act. It is the intent of the Legislature that state agencies, whenever appropriate, use 
the negotiated rulemaking process to resolve controversial issues prior to the 
commencement of the formal rulemaking process of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Negotiated rulemaking is not a substitute for the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act but may be used as a supplemental procedure to 
permit the direct participation of affected interests in the development of new rules 
or the amendment or repeal of existing rules. A consensus agreement on a proposed 
rule reached by a negotiated rulemaking committee may be modified by an agency 
as a result of the subsequent formal rulemaking process. This section shall not be 
construed as an attempt to limit innovation and experimentation with the negotiated 
rulemaking process. 
Id. § 84.922. 
255 FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (2013). 
256 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101–2-5-110 (2013). 
The purpose of this part is to establish a framework for the conduct of negotiated 
rulemaking consistent with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and the 
constitutional right of Montanans to participate in the operation of governmental 
agencies and to encourage agencies to use negotiated rulemaking when it enhances 
the rulemaking process. As authorized by 2-4-304, it is the intent of the legislature 
that state agencies, whenever appropriate, use the negotiated rulemaking process to 
resolve controversial issues prior to the commencement of the formal rulemaking 
process. However, negotiated rulemaking is not a substitute for the public 
notification and participation requirements of the Montana Administrative 
Procedure Act, and a consensus agreement by a negotiated rulemaking committee 
may be modified by an agency as a result of the subsequent rulemaking process. 
This part may not be construed as an attempt to limit innovation and 
experimentation with the negotiated rulemaking process. 
Id. § 2-5-102. 
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the state level increases the opportunities for the process to be utilized 
on a more local level. Often times, land use decisions and conflicts 
occur on the local level and involve several regional and community 
stakeholders. Therefore, negotiated rulemaking at the lower levels of 
government provides considerable opportunities to positively affect 
regional land use schemes and their corresponding regulations. 
Interestingly, in 1998, the Superintendent of the Fire Island 
National Seashore and the NPS sought a collaborative method of 
enacting new regulations to govern motor vehicle use on the island.257 
The purpose for applying a collaborative method of rulemaking was 
in response to citizen concerns about the current regulations and the 
need for the NPS to build a consensus based on all stakeholder 
opinions.258 The Consensus Building Institute was contracted to 
provide a Conflict Assessment and proposed the creation of the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee for Off-Road Driving 
Regulations at Fire Island National Seashore.259 
The purpose of the Conflict Assessment is to “evaluate whether a 
consensus-based negotiation could be convened and if is it likely to 
be successful in resolving issues about the FINS driving permit 
system.”260 The report notes that in making their determination, they 
considered four questions: (1) whether the key stakeholders were 
identifiable, (2) whether the key stakeholders had overlapping 
interests, (3) whether the key stakeholders were willing to work 
together, and (4) whether a capacity to negotiate existed.261 After a 
comprehensive analysis of the stakeholders and the substantive issues, 
the Conflict Assessment concluded that the NPS should proceed with 
a negotiated rulemaking process and identified the major 
stakeholders.262 
 
257 KOPPELMAN & FORMAN, supra note 76, at 143. 
258 Id. 
259 Id.; CONSENSUS BLDG. INST., CONFLICT ASSESSMENT: THE PROSPECTS FOR 
BUILDING CONSENSUS ON FIRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE’S VEHICLE USE 
REGULATIONS (1999), available at http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/upload/RegNeg 
_Prospectus_Sept-1999.pdf. 
260 Id. at 2. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 24. The negotiated rule making process started in 2002 and involved a twenty-
four person committee appointed by the Secretary of the Interior. A Final Consensus 
Agreement was entered into on August 22, 2003, and addresses many of the regulatory 
concerns including: number of permits, primary transportation, allowances for time and 
areas for driving, police driving, and management of driving. Off-Road Driving  
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The collaborative rulemaking process was a success and resulted in 
the promulgation of consensus-based regulations.263 This example 
proves that varying stakeholders, including local government 
representatives and community members, can collaborate on an issue 
to make an informed, transparent, and consensus-based decision 
regarding the future land use practices on the seashore. While the 
federal government initiated the negotiated rulemaking process under 
these facts, any governing entity that is seeking to amend or 
promulgate regulations should consider the negotiated rulemaking 
process. 
For example, local governments seeking to alter their local land use 
laws, such as the Town of Brookhaven, would benefit from this open 
process. They would be able to garner support and build a consensus 
for their proposals. If the Town of Brookhaven had negotiated its 
nonconforming use amendment, the local government may have been 
able to work with the NPS to enact a local law that serves local 
interests and regional goals. The NPS has stated that they are a 
stakeholder in the local process: 
As consulting party, NPS does not control or coordinate the process, 
but rather participates in it as an affected stakeholder. We have 
consulted with park staff and have learned that they have been 
carefully monitoring this activity and are aware of this new zoning 
code amendment, which has just been adopted only two weeks 
ago.264 
As a major stakeholder, admittedly, the NPS should not be limited in 
its capacity to partake in local land use decisions, such as a code 
change. This is especially true when the change will have an adverse 
impact on the seashore and is in violation of federal regulations. The 
negotiated rulemaking process allows the Town and the NPS to have 
this discussion prior to drafting any law or regulation. A discussion 
that will take place outside of the traditional participation methods 
proved ineffective in this case. 
 
Regulations, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/fiis/parkmgmt/off-road-driving-
regulations.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2013). 
263 KOPPELMAN & FORMAN, supra note 76, at 143. 
264 Letter from Michael Caldwell, Deputy Reg’l Dir., Nat’l Park Serv., to Thomas 
Brown and Marguerite Switzgable (Feb. 22, 2013) (on file with author). 
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CONCLUSION: A COLLABORATIVE AND REGIONAL SOLUTION TO 
CONSERVING THE NATION’S NATURAL RESOURCES 
This Article touched upon local and regional land use concepts, 
governance theories, and the principles of collaborative decision 
making. When taken out of the abstract and examined through 
practical cases, a set of best practices for the regulation of parklands 
encumbered by local governments and private property is realized. In 
these unique circumstances, a strong regional authority is necessary to 
mitigate the negative externalities that local land use decisions may 
create. However, local autonomy cannot be completely bypassed 
when formulating a regional structure. Local processes must be 
preserved to ensure that the benefits of localism—efficient provision 
of services, increased democratic processes, and a strong sense of 
community—are included in the regional scheme. To meet these 
ends, it is essential for any regional land use scheme to incorporate 
the notions of cooperative federalism and collaborative decision 
making. 
This Article suggests that the NPS seems distant from the local 
process and unaware of the land use practices local governments are 
supporting. Additionally, local governments are seeking to gain 
control back from the regional authority through illegitimate means. 
For the “Sword-of-Damocles” land use system to achieve successful 
conservation, a more collaborative process must be instilled where all 
parties, including the NPS, take an active role in land use planning 
and enforcement. A more collaborative method will increase 
transparency and better educate the community about the Fire Island 
National Seashore. Collaborative mechanisms will give local 
governments a legitimate avenue to control land uses within the 
region. Regional schemes, such as the “Sword-of-Damocles,” will not 
work with local governments regulating individually in conflict with 
the regional authority. 
Switching gears to the Adirondack Park, the APA has implemented 
a slightly different and more collaborative approach while 
maintaining strong enforcement powers. The APA is highly involved 
in the promulgation and enforcement of land use practices at the local 
level. This Article suggests that integrating a truly collaborative 
regional land use scheme is a solution to the anxieties and tensions 
between governing entities and stakeholders. A recent development 
project, the Adirondack Club and Resort, has evidenced feelings of 
anger on behalf of stakeholders who are calling for a more transparent 
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process. The approval process for the Adirondack Club and Resort 
lasted a decade due to stakeholder concerns and is still being litigated. 
Costly litigation and transparency concerns can be avoided if 
collaborative decision-making processes are set in place. 
This new regional approach, born from the notions of “New 
Regionalism,” shall consist of a strong regional authority coupled 
with the aforementioned collaborative methods. This represents best 
practices for the conservation of parklands that struggle with 
advancing regional goals while maintaining the advantages of the 
local process. As a result, local governments will feel vested in the 
regional efforts, and the regional authority will be able to promote and 
further regional conservation goals. An understanding of the 
stakeholders and the regional land use process must be reached. This 
model of best practices has the ability to improve communications 
and educate all stakeholders involved, a process that is lacking in 
most circumstances. 
 
